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Two Kinds of Plain Meaning 
Victoria F. Nourse† 
Is plain meaning so plain? This is not meant to be a 
philosophical question, but one deserving serious legal 
analysis. The plain-meaning rule claims to provide certainty 
and narrow statutes’ domains. As a relative claim, comparing 
plain meaning with purposivism, I agree. But I do not agree 
that plain-meaning analysis is as easy as its proponents 
suggest. In this piece, I tease out two very different ideas of 
plain meaning—ordinary/popular meaning and expansive/ 
legalist meaning—suggesting that doctrinal analysis requires 
more than plain-meaning simpliciter. Perhaps more 
importantly, I argue that plain meaning, as legalist meaning, 
can quite easily expand a statute’s scope, relative to a baseline 
of ordinary meaning or the status quo ex ante.  
In 1987, Justice Scalia gave an extremely influential set 
of lectures1 in which he set forth a doctrine of statutory 
interpretation known as the new textualism. The Scalia 
Tanner Lectures contain one of the most eloquent statements 
in print about the importance of legislation: “Every issue of law 
resolved by a federal judge involves interpretation of text—the 
text of a regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitution.”2 
Scalia’s theory influenced me, and a generation of scholars and 
students. In a world where very few lawyers have any clue 
about how legislation is debated—or even how to find 
legislative history3—the textualism rule is easy to understand 
  
 † Burrus-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. Special thanks 
to Professor Lawrence Solan whose essay on ordinary meaning, The New Textualists’ 
New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027 (2005), inspired these thoughts and to the 
students in my 2010 Legislation Class at Georgetown University Law Center who were 
so eager to focus on “two kinds” of plain meaning. All errors are, of course, my own.  
 1 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role 
of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997) (Justice Scalia’s essay based on the lectures, with third-party commentary and 
Justice Scalia’s response). 
 2 Id. at 13. 
 3 Elsewhere, I have been quite critical of law schools’ failure to teach 
congressional literacy. See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory 
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and teach. It seems such a simple rule: “[W]hen construing 
statutes, consider the text, the whole text, and nothing but the 
text. Period.”4  
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States5 figures 
prominently in Justice Scalia’s theory.6 The question in Holy 
Trinity was whether a British minister contracting to serve a 
New York church fell within a statute aimed to prevent large-
scale importation of immigrant laborers. The opinion opens by 
acknowledging Justice Scalia’s point: “It must be conceded that 
the act of the [church] is within the letter of [the] section,” the 
statute applying not only to “labor or service” but “labor or 
service of any kind.”7 To top it off, the Court notes that the 
statute exempted even singers, lecturers, and domestic 
servants, and thus “strengthens the idea that every other kind 
of labor and service” came within the law.8 Having noted all 
these textual arguments for covering the good rector, the Court 
ignored them; it read the statute to exclude him, relying on the 
rule that Congress’s intent trumped any plain reading. In the 
Court’s view, interpreting the statute to include a rector among 
imported “swine” was so broad that it “reach[ed] cases and acts 
which the whole history and life of the country affirm could not 
have been intentionally legislated against.”9 “[U]nder those 
circumstances,” the Court noted, “[i]t is the duty of the courts 
. . . to say that, however broad the language of the statute may 
be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the 
intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the 
statute.”10 Thus, a statute whose purpose was to prevent mass 
importation of manual laborers—not “brain toilers”—should 
not cover the rector.11 
To Justice Scalia, Holy Trinity was obviously wrong: 
“Well of course I think that the act was within the letter of the 
statute, and was therefore within the statute: end of case.”12 
  
Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 1119 (2011). 
 4 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1509, 1514 (1998) (reviewing A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1). 
 5 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 6 Scalia, supra note 1, at 18-22. 
 7 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 8 Id. at 458-59. 
 9 Id. at 472. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 464. 
 12 Scalia, supra note 1, at 20. 
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Holy Trinity, he argued, is “cited to us whenever counsel wants 
us to ignore the narrow, deadening text of the statute, and pay 
attention to the life-giving legislative intent. It is nothing but 
an invitation to judicial lawmaking.”13 As this excerpt suggests, 
one of Justice Scalia’s greatest claims for his position is 
constraint on activist judges: “[T]extualism constrains judges’ 
decisions more than other methods do, and it gives judges a 
principled method for interpreting statutes separate from their 
own ‘policy preferences.’”14 
There are many grounds on which I stand firmly with 
Justice Scalia. Law should be objective and restrained; it 
should not be the province of activist judges. Justice 
Frankfurter was right when he insisted, “read the text, read 
the text, read the text.”15 But I am also skeptical about the 
“plainness” of some assertions of plain meaning. In 
constitutional law, as Philip Bobbitt has argued, certain forms 
of argument—such as originalism and structuralism—have 
always played a role.16 So, too, in statutory interpretation. I 
teach the “Blackstone 5”—text, context, subject matter, 
effects/absurdity,17 and reason.18 These five forms of argument 
have been the consistent “liquidated” (to borrow a Madisonian 
phrase)19 forms of argument used by American courts in 
statutory interpretation since the founding.  
  
 13 Id. at 21. 
 14 Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of 
Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 
129, 143 (2008) (citing Scalia, supra note 1, at 17-18).  
 15 This is apparently filtered through the eyes of Judge Friendly. As a law 
professor, Justice Frankfurter advised his students to follow a three-pronged rule for 
statutory interpretation: (1) read the statute, (2) read the statute, and (3) read the 
statute. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967). 
 16 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 74-92 (1982) (on structural 
argument); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 178-79 (1991) (on 
originalism, which Bobbit terms the historical mode of interpretation). 
 17 I teach these as “originalist” forms of argument even though I have some 
concern that “absurdity” claims might be better resolved as conflicts between ordinary 
and legalist meaning. See infra note 22. 
 18 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 59 
(1765) (“The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is 
by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most 
natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject 
matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.”). Blackstone 
explains these with particular examples that give these terms greater meaning, 
consistent with the list asserted above. Id. 
 19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999) (“All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on 
the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
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Think hard now about two kinds of plain meaning. As 
linguist Larry Solan has written, ordinary meaning is 
prototypical meaning20—that is, meaning focusing on a core 
example, rather than reaching the conceptual or logical 
extension of the term. Prototypical meaning picks the best 
example, not the peripheral one. Now, let us apply this to Holy 
Trinity. In 1885 (when the Holy Trinity legislation was 
debated), the prototypical laborer was a miner or a railroad 
worker, not a minister—at least according to the dictionaries of 
the day.21 As the Holy Trinity Court explained, the “whole 
history and life of the country”22 rebelled at the notion that this 
law—aimed at “importing laborers as we import horses and 
cattle”23—could cover the voluntary passage of an upper-class 
minister. Justice Scalia, however, finds a different plain 
meaning; he finds the meaning prescribed by what the Court 
calls the letter of the law and what I will call legalist meaning 
(borrowing from Adrian Vermeule).24 Justice Scalia abstracts 
from the core and considers all logical possibilities within the 
concept of a laborer.  
Notice the difference between prototypical meaning and 
legalist meaning as it relates to the domain of the statute. As 
Chief Judge Easterbrook has written in a brilliant article, 
purposivism has a tendency to expand the range of a statute; 
this is certainly true if you assume that the baseline statute is 
  
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular 
discussions and adjudications.”).  
 20 Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
2027 (2005). 
 21 So, too, the prototypical “service” provider was a maid, not a rector. 
Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1518 (“The first definition of the term ‘labor’ listed in the 
1879 and 1886 editions of Webster’s Dictionary was ‘Physical toil or bodily exertion . . . 
hard muscular effort directed to some useful end, as agriculture, manufactures, and 
the like . . . .’” (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 745 (Chauncey A. Goodrich & Noah Porter eds., rev. ed. 1879))); see also id. 
at 1515-18 (discussing cases and the definition of labor in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
682 (1st ed. 1891), in which labor was equated with manual laborers and service to 
servants). Of course, there were secondary definitions, but the point is to find the “best” 
example under prototypical meaning, not any possible example. 
 22 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892). Holy 
Trinity is typically known as an “absurdity” case, but one way of thinking about 
absurdity is to view it as arising when there is a strong conflict between legalist 
meaning (e.g., all workers) and prototypical meaning (e.g., manual labor or service). 
Compare, for example, standard examples of absurdity: blood-letting (prototypical 
meaning = fight; legalist meaning = any bloodletting, including by a surgeon); and 
prison escape (prototypical meaning = escape to flout law; legalist meaning = any 
escape even if to escape fire). 
 23 16 CONG. REC. 1782 (1885) (statement of Sen. Platt). 
 24 ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 2-3 (2008).  
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in fact expanding the range of law.25 Notice, however, how a 
similar expansion may occur when one moves from ordinary to 
legalist meaning. By definition, prototypical meaning looks for 
the “best example”; legalist meaning looks for all examples, 
examples that may invite fringe or peripheral meanings.26 In 
Holy Trinity, the plain-meaning approach expands the 
meaning of the statute beyond the status quo ex ante (all labor, 
including the minister, versus the original baseline of no 
regulation of alien contract labor). More importantly, it 
expands the baseline relative to ordinary meaning. If the 
ordinary meaning was “manual labor or service” in 1885, then 
“all labor” expands the domain of the statute. Plain meaning of 
this kind (legalist meaning) expands the domain of the statute 
relative to plain meaning of another kind (ordinary meaning), 
suggesting that it should be important to decide which 
meaning counts. 
I am not confident enough of the distinction between 
ordinary/prototypical and legalist/expansive meaning to urge it 
as a matter of logic or linguistics. At the same time, there are 
enough examples to make this more than an academic 
curiosity. For example, in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 
the ordinary meaning (to the average person on the street) of 
defendant was criminal defendant; relative to a legalist 
meaning of defendant—which comprised all possible 
defendants, civil and criminal27—the ordinary-meaning 
interpretation narrowed the range of the balancing act at issue. 
Similarly, in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,28 the 
question was whether a government advisory committee was 
subject to a legalist meaning (i.e., any two persons conferring 
with the President, which could include his children or his 
political advisors), or an ordinary best-example meaning (i.e., 
an advisory committee created by the government). At the 
same time, it is important to acknowledge that, in some cases, 
prototypical or ordinary meaning itself may be contested.29  
One may conceive of the way legalist meaning may 
expand the range of the statute in the following diagram: 
  
 25 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). 
 26 Here, as well, there is an analogy to HLA Hart’s famous distinction 
between core and penumbral meaning. See DAVID LYONS, MORAL ASPECTS OF LEGAL 
THEORY: ESSAYS ON LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 84-86 (1993). 
 27 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989).  
 28 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452-65 (1989).  
 29 See Solan, supra note 20, at 2031 (“It is not always easy to decide what 
makes ordinary meaning ‘ordinary.’”). 
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There is nothing terribly modern about this idea. It has existed 
in statutory interpretation since the sixteenth century, 
expressed in the shell-and-kernel metaphor: 
And the law may be resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a 
kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell, and the 
sense of it the kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you 
make use only of the shell, so you will receive no benefit by the law, 
if you rely only upon the letter.30 
Here, the kernel represents prototypical “sense” while the shell 
represents the legalist “letter of the law.” At the founding, 
American courts were fond of a similar idea, quoting the Latin 
phrase nam qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice (he who sticks 
to the letter of the law will only stick to its bark).31 
Academic textualists have not, in my opinion, grappled 
with this distinction as much as they might. Instead, there 
seems to be a good deal of talk of ordinary meaning 
  
 30 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 4 (1994) 
(quoting Reporter’s Note to Eyston v. Studd, (1574) 75 Eng. Rep. 688 (K.B.) 695-96; 2 
Plowden 459, 465). 
 31 E.g., Church v. Thomson, 1 Kirby 98, 99, 1786 WL 117 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1786); Olin v. Chipman, 2 Tyl. 148, 150, 1802 WL 778 (Vt. 1802); Miller’s Lessee v. 
Holt, 1 Tenn. 111, 5 (1805); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14, 29, 1806 WL 735 
(1806); Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162, 183, 1811 WL 1169 (1811). My thanks to the 
research assistance of Asher Steinberg, Georgetown University Law Center Class of 
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accompanied by a definition of ordinary meaning as technical 
or legalist. John Manning writes that “textualists seek out 
technical meaning, including the specialized connotations and 
practices common to the specialized sub-community of 
lawyers.”32 As Jonathan Molot writes, textualists tend to see 
“words written on a piece of paper, rather than as a collective 
effort by elected representatives to govern on behalf of their 
constituents.”33 This tendency to detach chunks of text from the 
statute and then hold them up to the light to test their logical 
extent reflects the lawyerly love of logic. Indeed, one leading 
scholar and Federalist Society member writes, “The textualist 
judge treats questions of interpretation like a puzzle to which it 
is assumed there is one right answer.”34  
This tendency to prefer legalist meaning is reflected in 
two important aspects of textual theory. Generally, new 
textualism advertises itself as a more restrained view of 
statutory interpretation, relative to intentionalism or 
purposivism. Although textualists claim that, unlike 
purposivists, they do not “add” meaning to text, in fact, they do. 
They may reject legislative history, but they are perfectly 
willing to add lawyerly meanings taken from past precedents, 
canons of construction, and even the common law. The implied 
preference for specialized meanings speaks loudest in 
textualists’ affection for the common-law baseline. As one 
prominent textualist writes, “Textualists assign common-law 
terms their full array of common-law connotations; they 
supplement otherwise unqualified texts with settled common-
law practices . . . .”35 Surely, however, this affection for the 
common law stands in some tension with the notion of ordinary 
meaning. Does the ordinary man or woman on the street know 
much about the common law? Does the ordinary legislator?  
Textualists reply that it is not fair to tar textualism 
with affection for arcane lawyerly meanings; textualists seek 
ordinary meanings. Justice Scalia writes, 
  
 32 John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 
434-35 (2005). 
 33 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
48 (2006). 
 34 Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994). 
 35 Manning, supra note 32, at 435 (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 
103, 121 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual 
context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask 
whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning 
other than the ordinary one applies. If not—and especially if a good 
reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that 
ordinary meaning.36 
I agree entirely. But, as other scholars have wondered, a gap 
may remain between talking about ordinary meaning and 
applying ordinary meaning. There is reason to wonder, for 
example, whether the best and brightest lawyers confuse 
ordinary meaning with expert or specialized meaning.37 In one 
recent study of Justice Scalia’s dissents, the author found that 
“plain meaning . . . refer[red] to something different than 
‘ordinary meaning’ . . . to a specialized but accepted meaning of 
a term.”38 In another empirical study, the political scientist 
Frank Cross found that “[o]verall, the plain meaning standard 
seems ideologically manipulable and incapable of constraining 
preferences to provide greater consensus.”39 In yet another more 
recent empirical study based on over 1000 subject responses, 
Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior, and Anup Mulani found that 
plain meaning correlated with ideological bias, whereas 
ordinary meaning did not.40 There is a reason for this: plain 
meaning simply asserts its plainness, and thus bears the risk 
of dogmatism and self-regard (i.e., “it is plain because I say 
so”). Ordinary meaning requires the interpreter to put herself 
in the shoes of a nonlegal audience; it has a built-in form of 
impartiality, not to mention democratic appeal. Perhaps that 
helps explain empirical work showing that Congress has a 
greater tendency to “override” plain-meaning decisions than 
decisions relying on legislative history.41 
  
 36 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). In the constitutional context, he is similarly insistent. See, e.g., 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008). 
 37 Solan, supra note 20. 
 38 McGowan, supra note 14, at 149 (emphasis added). 
 39 FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 166 (2009). 
 40 Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Mulani, Ambiguity About 
Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257 
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441860. Farnsworth, Guzior, and Mulani 
usefully distinguish between plain meaning as an internal view and ordinary meaning 
as external. Whereas the question, “is this meaning plain?” tends to elicit views 
correlated with strong ideological positions (the internal view), the question, “would an 
ordinary person think this meaning is plain?” does not (the external view). 
 41 See CROSS, supra note 39, at 82-83 (summarizing this evidence); see also 
Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 
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Here lies an important question for textualist theory. 
New textualism remains unclear about precisely what type of 
meanings it will apply.42 While some textualists tend to 
emphasize expert meaning and semantic content, others 
emphasize ordinary meaning. Indeed, some textualists are 
quick, even within a single article, to refer to ordinary meaning 
and specialized meaning as if there were no difference between 
the two.43 Perhaps textualists are assuming that the average 
citizen is a lawyer—something I am quite sure the voting 
public would find odd, if not offensive. The very existence of 
two kinds of plain meaning calls for a theory concerning when 
a court should apply expert meaning and when it should apply 
public, or prototypical, meaning.  
  
VAND. L. REV. 887 (2000); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 350 tbl.8 (1991); Michael E. 
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme 
Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425 (1992). 
 42 See Molot, supra note 33, at 36 (“[L]ittle attention is devoted to the 
interpretive methodology textualism offers to replace strong purposivism and on 
variations within the textualist movement.”). 
 43 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
